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NOTES
COMMUNITY OWNERSHIP OF IMMOVABLES:
BOND FOR DEED CONTRACTS
During the existence of his first marriage, Sidney Cosey
entered into, but failed to record, a bond for deed contract for the
purchase of immovable property. After his last payment had been
made, but before the act of sale was executed and recorded, Cosey
divorced and remarried. During his second marriage, the vendor
transferred title, naming Cosey and his second wife as vendees.
After Cosey's death, plaintiff, a child of the first marriage and sole
heir of Cosey, sought a judgment decreeing that the property
belonged to the community formerly existing between his parents.'
The trial court held that the second wife was bound to return the
property she had received unduly. The court of appeal reversed,
holding that the property formed part of the second community. On
rehearing, the supreme court reversed and held that Cosey and his
first wife were owners in indivision of a one-half interest each in the
property. Cosey v. Cosey, 376 So. 2d 486 (La. 1979).
The French Civil Code provides that a promise of sale becomes
a sale as soon as there is mutual consent as to the thing and the
price.' In 1910 Louisiana Civil Code article 2462 was amended' to
provide that the "reciprocal consent of both parties . . . so far
amounts to a sale, as to give either party the right to enforce
specific performance . . . ."' This amendment codified jurisprudence6
that had distinguished a promise to sell from a sale, the former be-
ing "a bilateral contract to sell, but not a sale, since the latter in-
volves a transfer of ownership."6
1. This controversy only concerns a one-half interest in the property since the
plaintiff inherited a one-half interest as Cosey's legal heir.
2. FRENCH CIv. CODE arts. 1583, 1589 (J. Crabb trans. 1977). See generally Smith,
An Analytical Discussion of the Promise of Sale and Related Subjects, Including
Earnest Money, 20 LA. L. REV. 522 (1960).
3. 1910 La. Acts, No. 249.
4. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2462.
5. See McDonald v. Aubert, 17 La. 448 (1841). "[A] promise to sell, when the
thing to be sold and the price of it are agreed upon ... does not place the thing at the
risk of the promisee, nor does it transfer to him the ownership or dominion of it." Id.
at 451.
6. Smith, supra note 2, at 529. See 2 S. LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS § 121, in 7 LoUI-
SIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 220 (1969).
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
In Louisiana the bond for deed contract is defined as a "contract
to sell,"7 and the jurisprudence has interpreted it as merely a con-
tract to sell and not as a sale translative of ownership.8 The bond for
deed contract is a statutory exception to the Louisiana rule pro-
hibiting conditional sales wherein the sellcr retains the title while
the buyer is bound to pay the price.' It is applicable only to real
property and contains technical requirements designed to insure
protection of the purchaser, since title does not pass until the condi-
tion of payment of a stipulated price has been fulfilled." It must be
noted that title does not pass automatically to the vendee; rather,
after fulfillment of the condition (payment), the seller "agrees to
deliver title to the buyer.""1 Upon entering into the bond for deed
contract, the parties have a right to demand specific performance.12
That right, although existing from the time that the contract is
entered, cannot be exercised until the condition is fulfilled. 3
The leading community property case involving a bond for deed
contract is Kendall v. Kendall,' in which a husband made most of
the payments during his second marriage, but title passed during
his third marriage. Finding that the property belonged to the third
community, the court relied on Civil Code article 2402," which
focuses on the time that property actually is acquired in order to
determine its status as community or not. The court reasoned that
"[a]cquisition by purchase, within the intendment of this article,
clearly means that there must be an act of sale transferring title to
7. LA. R.S. 9:2941 (1950) provides: "[a] bond for deed is a contract to sell real
property, in which the purchase price is to be paid by the buyer to the seller in in-
stallments and in which the seller after payment of a stipulated sum agrees to deliver
title to the buyer."
8. See, e.g., Pruyn v. Gay, 159 La. 981, 106 So. 536 (1925); Campbell v. Richmond
Ins. Co., 156 La. 455, 100 So. 679 (1924); Trichel v. Home Ins. Co., 155 La. 459, 99 So.
403 (1924).
9. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. St. Louis Cypress Co., 121 La. 152, 46 So. 193
(1908).
10. LA. R.S. 9:2941-47 (1950). See Comment, Bond for Deed Contracts, 31 LA. L.
REV. 587 (1971).
11. LA. R.S. 9:2941 (1950) (emphasis added).
12. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2462. See Leinhardt v. Marrero Land and Improvement
Ass'n, Ltd., 137 So. 2d 387 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962); 2 S. LITVINOFF, supra note 6, at
224.
13. 2 S. LITVINOFF, supra note 6, at 227, citing Bourneman v. Richards, 245 La.
851, 161 So. 2d 241 (1964).
14. 174 La. 148, 140 So. 6 (1932).
15. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2402 (as it appeared prior to 1979 La. Acts, No. 709; 1978
La. Acts, No. 627): "[The] community consists of ... the estate ... [acquired] during
the marriage ... by purchase ... because ... the period of time when the purchase is
made is alone attended to, and not the person who made the purchase."
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real property, and not merely an agreement to sell." 6 Therefore,
since the act of sale was executed during the third community, the
property formed part of that community. The plaintiff, the
husband's sole heir, inherited his ancestor's one-half interest in the
property, but had only a right of reimbursement for sums paid prior
to the third marriage.
In Connell v. Connell" a husband acquired four life insurance
policies before his marriage, and the wife acquired one insurance
policy before her marriage; a second policy was acquired during
their marriage. The court held that the policy acquired during the
existence of the community regime was a community asset, but that
the policies acquried before the marriage were separate property,
notwithstanding the use of community funds to pay the premiums.
Concerning the use of community funds, the court stated that
"[i]nasmuch as community funds were used to pay premiums while
the community existed, [the individual spouse] is responsible to the
community for whatever enhancement in value the policy experienced
from the use of community funds."'8
The court has reached different results when confronted with
contingent fee contracts and pension plans. In Due v. Due," the hus-
band, a lawyer, entered a contingent fee contract which was only
partially performed at the time of dissolution of the marriage. The
court held the interest in the contingent fee contract to be property
that formed part of the community "insofar as its value is based
upon the attorney's services performed during the marriage."" In
T.L. James & Co., Inc. v. Montgomery," the husband was entitled
to share in the benefits of a retirement plan and a profit-sharing
plan, the funds for which were supplied solely by the employer. The
court found that the right to share in the proceeds was acquired
during the marriage and held that his wife "is thus entitled to be
recognized as the owner of one-half the value of the right-to-share,
insofar as attributable to the contributions paid into the fund . ..
during the existence of the community ....
There are three theories for determining the status of property
as community or separate: time-of-vesting, inception-of-title, and pro
16. 174 La. at 153, 140 So. at 8.
17. 331 So. 2d 4 (La. 1976).
18. Id. at 8.
19. 342 So. 2d 161 (La. 1977).
20. Id. at 165-66.
21. 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976).
22. Id. at 851.
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rata." The time-of-vesting theory focuses on the time that title is
transferred; "the fact that title [passes] during marriage makes
ownership presumptively community.""4 When confronted with im-
movable property, as in Kendall, the court uses the time-of-vesting
theory. The inception-of-title theory is used to classify life insurance
policies; the court in Connell merely focuses on when each policy has
its inception. When the acquisition of other types of movable property
bridges a change in the status of the parties, the court uses a pro
rata method of apportionment, rather than focusing on the time that
title vests or the time of the title's inception."2
In Cosey,6 the court reached a result contrary to that reached in
Kendall, with the only distinguishing fact being that in Cosey all the
payments had been made during the previous community. Sidney
Cosey married Hattie Harris in 1915. They had one child, Sidney
Cosey, Jr. (plaintiff). In 1945, Cosey Sr. entered into a bond for deed
contract with the C.E. Cates Estate, in which contract Cosey Sr.
agreed to pay $825 in stipulated installments, after which the Cates
Estate agreed to transfer title. This bond for deed contract was
never recorded. In 1961, Cosey Sr. made the final payments, but
because of the death of a co-owner, the Cates Estate delayed the
transfer of title to the property. In 1962 Cosey Sr. and Hattie were
divorced, and Cosey Sr. married Lillian Tyler. Later that year the
Cates Estate transferred the property to "Sidney and Lillian Cosey
once married and living together." This deed was recorded. Hattie
died in 1964, and Cosey Sr. died in 1976; they were survived by
their only child, Cosey Jr., who qualified as administrator of the suc-
cessions of his parents and brought an action against Lillian Cosey
and the Cates Estate to obtain a judgment decreeing that the prop-
erty belonged to the community formerly existing between his
parents.
The trial court reasoned that, because the second wife's claim to
one-half the property arose through error on the part of the notary
naming her as joint purchaser, and because all of the funds used to
pay for the property belonged to the first community, the second
wife had received property not due her. The court held that she was
bound by Civil Code articles 2301 and 2312 "to restore it to him
from whom [she had] unduly received it."27 The court of appeal re-
23. W. REPPY, W. DEFUNIAK, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: A COM-
PARATIVE STUDY BY CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 220-21 (1975).
24. Id. at 220.
25. See text at notes 19-22, supra.
26. Cosey v. Cosey, 376 So. 2d 486 (La. 1979).
27. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2301.
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versed, 8 finding Kendall to be controlling. On original hearing, the
supreme court affirmed, holding: (1) because the bond for deed con-
tract was unrecorded, the second wife (who was a third party) ac-
quired the property free from any interest the first wife may have
had,"9 and (2) because there was no error in the act of sale, parol
evidence was inadmissible to show that the vendee was someone
other than the one named in the deed.30 On rehearing, however, the
court reversed itself, holding that at the time of their deaths, plain-
tiffs parents were owners in indivision of the property and that the
second wife was bound by Civil Code articles 2301 and 2312 to
return the property.
The vacillation of the court illustrates the difficulty of the case.
The trial court and the supreme court on rehearing basically ex-
amined the equities and gave the property to the party who had
paid for it. On original hearing the supreme court reached the proper
result, but applied the public records doctrine 3' rather than examin-
ing the rights of the parties under bond for deed contracts and ap-
plying the community property articles to those rights. Upon enter-
ing the bond for deed contract, the buyer has the right to demand
specific performance.32 However, although the right exists, it may
not be exercised until fulfillment of the condition. 3 Therefore, when
the question is into which of two communities the property falls, the
28. Cosey v. Cosey, 364 So. 2d 186 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
29. It is established in Louisiana that interests in immovable property must be
recorded to affect third persons. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2264, 2266; LA. R.S. 9:2721 (1950).
See McDuffie v. Walker, 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1909).
30. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 2236, 2238, 2276, 2440. See Eberle v. Eberle, 161 La. 313,
108 So. 549 (1926).
31. See note 28, supra. In the Cosey dissent on original hearing, it was observed
that any right that the second wife had to the property was as a "successor party" to
the bond for deed contract. She should not fall under the protection offered by the
McDuffie doctrine because the "purpose of the recordation provisions [is] to establish a
dependable and functional method by which a prospective buyer can ascertain the title
to real estate .... " Comment, Registration of Title to Immovables in Louisiana, 32
TUL. L. REV. 677, 678 (1958) (emphasis added). The second wife should not be able to
receive property under an unrecorded contract and at the same time be allowed to
claim she is not privy to it. Cf. Meraux v. R.R. Barrow, Inc., 219 La. 309, 52 So. 2d 863
(1951) (grantees in a royalty deed of real property, who were sole stockholders of a cor-
poration which purchased the property, could not claim the corporation to be a third
party to exclude a co-grantee in the unrecorded royalty deed); Porterfield v. Parker,
189 La. 720, 180 So. 498 (1938) (heirs of the wife could not claim to be third parties'
unaffected by an unrecorded sale made by the husband during the marriage and before
the wife's death).
32. Leinhardt v. Marrero Land Improvement Ass'n, Ltd., 137 So. 2d 387 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1962).
33. 2 S. LITVINOFF, supra note 6.
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distinguishing fact in Kendall-that payments had not been com-
pleted, whereas in Cosey all payments had been made by the time of
dissolution of the first marriage-should make no difference. No
greater right exists upon full payment in Cosey than the right ex-
isting after partial payment in Kendall: Cosey's right is merely no
longer inchoate. In neither situation has there been a transfer of title.
The sale under a bond for deed contract is a conditional sale. It
can be argued that upon fulfillment of the condition, the time title
vests is made retroactively effective to the date the contract was
entered. 4 However, "compliance with the condition only renders the
contract executory; makes the reciprocal promises absolute and
establishes the rights and liabilities of the parties as of the date of
the agreement." 5
The right arising in the bond for deed contract is not susceptible
to analogy to employee benefit plans and contingent fee contracts.
In cases concerning those contracts, the court has held that "among
the assets of the community ... are obligations based upon the right
to receive money . . .even though this right is contingent upon the
happening of an event at a future time.""6 In Due7 the court reached
the conclusion that property, within the meaning of Civil Code ar-
ticles 2402 and 2334,8 means all patrimonial rights, ie., all rights
susceptible to pecuniary evaluation. 9 Clearly the right under a bond
for deed contract fits this definition. The problem arises not with
the definition of "property," but rather with what is meant by the
phrase "acquire during the marriage . . . by purchase, or in any
other similar way . . . .,,Kendall construed the phrase to mean that
"there must be an act of sale transferring title to real property ... 41
34. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2041 states: "[tjhe condition being complied with, has a
retrospective effect to the day that the engagement was contracted... "
35. Ober v. Williams, 213 La. 568, 580, 35 So. 2d 219, 223 (1948). Cf. Wampler v.
Wampler, 239 La. 315, 118 So. 2d 423 (1960) (wife could not claim an undivided one-half
interest in an oil and gas mineral lease which was assigned to the husband prior to
divorce decree on condition that titles be examined and approved, when the conditions
did not occur until after the divorce).
36. Due v. Due, 342 So. 2d 161, 163 (La. 1977), citing T.L. James & Co., Inc. v.
Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976).
37. Due v. Due, 342 So. 2d 161 (La. 1977).
38. Subsequent to the supreme court's Due decision, articles 2334 and 2402 were
amended. See 1979 La. Acts, No. 709; 1978 La. Acts, No. 627. The recent legislation's
impact is treated below. See notes 55-61, infra, and accompanying text..
39. The court reaches this conclusion citing A. YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA CIVIL
LAW SYSTEM § 70, 243 (1971) and A. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 1, in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL
LAW TREATISE 2 (1967).
40. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2402 (as it appeared prior to 1979 La. Acts, No. 709; 1978
La. Acts, No. 627).
41. 174 La. at 153, 140 So. at 8.
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The fact that under a bond for deed contract one has the right to
receive an immovable, rather than a movable, should bar analogy to
the Due line of cases: the transfer of immovable property must be in
writing.'2 Civil Code article 2402 clearly mandates that "the period
of time when the purchase is made is alone attended to, and not the
person who made the purchase. 14 3 This suggests that when dealing
with immovable property, the pro rata method of distribution should
not be followed.
The function of articles 2334 and 2402 is to fix the status of
property. The court's error was encouraged by the seemingly ineq-
uitable result reached by application of the law. If Cosey had never
remarried, a transfer of property to him after his divorce would not
have resulted in ownership in indivision by Cosey and his former
wife, because the property would not have been acquired "during
the marriage."" The fact that the property falls into the second com-
munity (because it was acquired during the existence of the second
community) has no relation to the determination that it is not part
of the first community. The code articles, vis-a-vis the second com-
munity, do not divest the first community of property which never
formed a part of that community.
Upon the termination of the first community, the wife has a
right of reimbursement from Cosey Sr.'s separate estate for one-half
the community funds used to purchase the property.45 This debt is
extinguished by confusion upon the death of Harriet and Cosey Sr.
because the creditor (heir of Harriet, Cosey Jr.) and the debtor (heir
of Cosey Sr., Cosey Jr.) are the same person.0 However, upon ter-
mination of the second community, Cosey Sr.'s separate estate is owed
a reimbursement for his "separate funds" used to purchase the prop-
erty. One-half of the reimburserment is paid by the second wife.
Therefore, the reimbursement provision in the Civil Code adequately
protects all parties.
Cosey questions the validity of past, correct jurisprudence: the
court ignores the construction given to article 2402 in Kendall by
42. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2440.
43. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2402 (as it appeared prior to 1978 La. Acts, No. 627) (em-
phasis added).
44. Succession of Fay, 161 La. 1022, 109 So. 824 (1926); Succession of Le Besque,
137 La. 567, 68 So. 956 (1915). But see Golding v. Golding, 43 La. Ann. 555, 9 So. 638
(1891).
45. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2408 (as it appeared prior to 1979 La. Acts, No. 709; 1978
La. Acts, No. 627); Kendall v. Kendall, 174 La. 148, 140 So. 6 (1932); Jefferson v.
Stringfellow, 148 La. 223, 86 So. 774 (1920); Pennison v. Pennison, 157 So. 2d 628 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1963) cert. denied, 245 La. 585, 159 So. 2d 290 (1964).
46. Guillory v. Desormeaux, 166 So. 2d 575 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
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focusing not on when the property is acquired, but rather, on who
contributes toward its acquisition.'7 After determining that the prop-
erty belongs to the community which contributed to its acquisition,
rather than the one which acquired it, the court further relies on the
absence of facts evincing Cosey's desire that his second wife share
in the property with him. 8 In the absence of a dual declaration,'9
this inquiry should have no relevance, even if this action had been
brought by Cosey against his second wife.5" In contrast, the Kendall
rationale provides an easy and dependable method of fixing the
ownership of immovable property.
Although on the Cosey facts the inception-of-right theory and
the pro rata method yield the same result, the difference in ra-
tionales is significant. If the inception-of-right theory 1 is used, the
property forms part of the first community, because the acquisition
process began during the first marriage. This method of classification
is also acceptable when dealing with immovable property, because,
as in application of the time-of-vesting theory," a single, definite
event is controlling. Under the pro rata method," the property
would belong to the first community because all the payments were
made with community funds. The result is acceptable under the
Cosey fact situation. What if the payments, however, had been made
at three different times (e.g. during both communities and while
Cosey Sr. was single)? By speaking in terms of the "interest" in the
property, the court suggests, like the Due court, that an interest ac-
quired during marriage becomes community property.5 Yet how are
third persons put on notice as to each person who may have an "in-
terest" in the property?
Under the amendments to the Louisiana Civil Code community
property articles," the result reached by the court would be correct:
47. 376 So.2d at 491.
48. Id. at 492.
49. See Sharp v. Zeller, 110 La. 61, 34 So. 129 (1902). In making this inquiry into
Cosey Sr.'s intent, the court has abandoned the rule that property bought by the hus-
band during marriage is conclusively presumed to be community property in the
absence of a declaration in the act of sale stating that: (1) the husband's separate funds
were used and (2) it is the husband's intent that the property belong to his separate
estate.
50. A further interesting "reason" for the result reached by the court is the lack
of evidence showing the second wife "realized" her interest "by virtue of her rights in
the community." 376 So. 2d at 492. There has never been a requirement of knowledge
to invoke articles 2334 and 2402.
51. See notes 23-24, supra.
52. See notes 23-24, supra, and accompanying text.
53. See note 25, supra, and accompanying text.
54. 342 So. 2d at 165.
55. See 1979 La. Acts, No. 709.
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the property would fall into the first community. There is a rebut-
table presumption that things in possession of a spouse during the
existence of a community regime are community property."6 Article
2338 states that "community property comprises ... [that] property
acquired with community things . . . unless classified as separate
property under article 2341 .... ." This requirement does not focus
on when the property was acquired, but rather on what was used to
acquire it. Furthermore, article 234158 does not address the situation
in which property is acquired after termination of a community
property regime. Therefore, the new classification scheme allows
property to be classified as community property regardless of when
title was transferred, provided that community funds were used to
acquire the property. The second wife's claim that the property
formed part of the second community is erroneous, because the
property was not "acquired during existence of the legal regime
through the effort, skil4 or industry of either spouse; [nor] acquired
"159with community things ....
The decision in Cosey, read in conjunction with Act 709 of 1979,
could signal the application of the pro rata classification scheme to
immovables. The court's focus on the "interest" in the property sug-
gests that the court may be ready to expand even further the defini-
tion of property used in Due."° Perhaps most significantly, the deci-
56. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2340.
57. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2338. The present text states:
The community property comprises: property acquired during the existence of
the legal regime through the effort, skill, or industry of either spouse; property
acquired with community things or with community and separate things, unless
classified as separate property under Article 2341; property donated to the
spouses jointly; natural and civil fruits of community property; damages awarded
for loss or injury to a thing belonging to the community; and all other property
not classified by law as separate property.
(Emphasis added).
58. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2341:
The separate property of a spouse is his exclusively. It comprises: property ac-
quired by a spouse prior to the establishment of a community property regime;
property acquired by a spouse with separate things or with separate and com-
munity things when the value of the community things is inconsequential in com-
parison with the value of the separate things used, property acquired by a spouse
by inheritance or donation to him individually; damages awarded to a spouse in an
action for breach of contract against the other spouse or for the loss sustained as
a result of fraud or bad faith in the management of community property by the
other spouse; and damages or other indemnity awarded to a spouse in connection
with the management of his separate property.
(Emphasis added).
59. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2338 (emphasis added).
60. "Included among the assets of the community ... are obligations based upon
the right to receive money to become due in the future .... " 342 So. 2d at 163.
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sion is bolstered by the removal of the requirement that "the period
of time when the purchase is made is alone attended to" 1 by Act
709 of 1979.
William L. Hearne
Baten v. Taylor: SURVIVORSHIP CLAUSES SURVIVE THE CIVIL LAW
Gordon D. Baten died testate at his domicile in Beaumont,
Texas, leaving separate immovable property situated in Louisiana to
his wife on the condition that she survive him by thirty days. In the
event that the condition was not fulfilled, the property was to go to
his nephews. The decedent's sister, his presumptive intestate heir,
unsuccessfully attacked the will in district court. The decision was
reversed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, which held that the
disposition conflicted with Civil Code article 1520, prohibiting "sub-
stitutions" as defined by that article, and article 1609, which, in the
absence of forced heirs, gives the universal legatee seizin of the suc-
cession immediately upon the testator's death.1 Despite the
obstacles posed by these two articles, the Louisiana Supreme Court
reversed, holding: (1) the disposition contained none of the essential
characteristics of a prohibited substitution as defined by article
1520, and (2) a universal legacy subject to a suspensive condition
does not conflict with the seizin provisions of the Civil Code. Baten
v. Taylor, 386 So. 2d 333 (La. 1979).
A condition which depends upon the occurrence of a futdre or
uncertain event is classified as either suspensive or resolutory.,
That which takes effect only upon the happening of the event is said
to be suspensive,' while that which takes effect immediately but is
defeated by the event is deemed resolutory.4 A testator is free to
impose such conditions upon a testamentary disposition,5 provided
that they are not illegal, immoral, or impossible.' Conditions such as
that in the present case, known generally as survivorship clauses,
61. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2402 (as it appeared prior to 1979 La. Acts, No. 709; 1978
La. Acts, No. 627).
1. Succession of Gwathmey, 364 So. 2d 226 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
2. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 2021, 2043, 2045.
3. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2021, 2043.
4. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2021, 2045.
5. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 1519, 1527, 1698, 1699.
6. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1519, 1527, 2031.
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